A controversial and revisionist account of the intellectual relationship between Russell and Wittgenstein.
Preface ixRereading Russell and Wittgenstein 1Two dogmas of Russellian interpretation 5Logical fictions of Russell 11Logical atomism 24Logical atomism as a research program 25The logical independence of the facts that are truth-makers 40Acquaintance with logical objects 53Russell's paralysis 65Retreat from Pythagoras 72My fundamental idea 77Showing as radical Russellianism 79Ideal versus ordinary language 90Sub specie aeternitatis 94Russell's rejection of Showing 100Kicking away the ladder 103Logic as if tautologous 107Logic as if decidable 112Scaffolding 118Wittgenstein's N-operator 125Quantification and the N-operator 134Tractarian logicism 147Ramified types as scaffolding in Russell and Wittgenstein 150Equations versus tautologies 158Numbers as exponents of operations 170Principia's second edition 189Extensionality and neutral monism 192The oracle on Reducibility 201Slipshod notations? 208Ramsey's extensional functions 214Logic as the essence of philosophy 111Ontology as meaningless 230Ontology as structured variables 237Carnap versus Quine on ontology 241Return to Pythagoras 245Exclusive quantifiers 253Modality in the Tractatus 266Bibliography 285Index 297