Wittgenstein's Account of Truth
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Ellenbogen (Boston College) contends that German philosopher Wittgenstein's (1889-1951) later conception of meaning calls for a revision in what it means to call a statement true. She argues that the dictum Meaning is Use implies that a statement can only be called true within a set of criteria of truth that the speaker and listener have previously agreed on. Annotation ©2003 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR
AbbreviationsPrefaceAcknowledgmentsPt. IFrom "Meaning Is Use" to the Rejection of Transcendent Truth11Wittgenstein's Rejection of Realism versus Semantic Antirealism22The Positive Account of Truth63Antirealism Revisited19Pt. IIFrom "Meaning Is Use" To Semantic Antirealism254The Acquisition Argument and the Manifestation Criterion275Antirealism Presupposes Realism346Tensions Between Wittgenstein and Dummett447Semantic Antirealism Is Inconsistent55Pt. IIIWhy A Revisionist Account Of Truth?598Criteria and Justification Conditions619Criteria and Realist Truth Conditions7510Why Criteria Are Not Defeasible8311Criterial Change, Conceptual Change, and Their Implications for the Concept of Truth9012Why a Revisionist Account of Truth?110Notes117Bibliography137Index145
