The Limits of Logical Empiricism: Selected Papers of Arthur Pap
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This volume brings together a selection of the most philosophically significant papers of Arthur Pap. As Sanford Shieh explains in the Introduction to this volume, Pap’s work played an important role in the development of the analytic tradition. This role goes beyond the merely historical fact that Pap’s views of dispositional and modal concepts were influential. As a sympathetic critic of logical empiricism, Pap, like Quine, saw a deep tension in logical empiricism at its very best in the work of Carnap. But Pap’s critique of Carnap is quite different from Quine’s, and represents the discovery of limits beyond which empiricism cannot go, where there lies nothing other than intuitive knowledge of logic itself. Pap’s arguments for this intuitive knowledge anticipate Etchemendy’s recent critique of the model-theoretic account of logical consequence. Pap’s work also anticipates prominent developments in the contemporary neo-Fregean philosophy of mathematics championed by Wright and Hale. Finally, Pap’s major philosophical preoccupation, the concepts of necessity and possibility, provides distinctive solutions and perspectives on issues of contemporary concern in the metaphysics of modality. In particular, Pap’s account of modality allows us to see the significance of Kripke’s well-known arguments on necessity and apriority in a new light. This volume will be of interest to all researchers in the philosophical history of the analytic tradition, in philosophy of logic, philosophy of mathematics, and contemporary analytic metaphysics.
Pt. IThemes in Pap's philosophical writings1Overview of Pap's philosophical work32Necessity as analyticity103Necessity as (implicit) linguistic convention124The analytic-synthetic distinction : hypothetical or functional necessity155The analytic-synthetic distinction : dispositional and open concepts166The limits of hypothetical necessity : formal or absolute necessity237Logical consequence and material entailment248The method of conceivability279Comparison with necessity in contemporary analytic metaphysics3010Logicism3311Concluding remarks42Pt. IIAnalyticity, a priority and necessity1On the meaning of necessity472The different kinds of a priori573Logic and the synthetic a priori774Are all necessary propositions analytic?915Necessary propositions and linguistic rules109Pt. IIISemantic analysis : truth, propositions, and realism6Note on the "semantic" and the "absolute" concepts of truth147AppRejoinder to Mrs. Robbins1547Propositions, sentences, and the semantic definition of truth1558Belief and propositions1659Semantic examination of realism181Pt. IVPhilosophy of logic and mathematics10Logic and the concept of entailment19711Strict implication, entailment, and modal iteration20512Mathematics, abstract entities, and modern semantics21313Extensionality, attributes, and classes23314A note on logic and existence23715The linguistic hierarchy and the vicious-circle principle243Pt. VPhilosophy of mind16Other minds and the principle of verifiability24917Semantic analysis and psycho-physical dualism269Pt. VIPhilosophy of science18The concept of absolute emergence28519Reduction sentences and open concepts295Appendix31620Extensional logic and laws of nature31721Disposition concepts and extensional logic32722Are physical magnitudes operationally definable?351Pt. VIIArthur Pap's life and writings23Arthur Pap (1921-1959) : intellectual biography of Arthur Pap36524Arthur Pap : biographical notes36925A bibliography of Arthur Pap375
