How do judges determine the meaning of laws? The extent to which judges should exercise their discretion in interpreting legislation has been a contentious issue throughout American history, involving questions about the balance of power between the legislature and the judiciary. In Statutes in Court William D. Popkin provides an indispensable survey of the history of American statutory interpretation and then offers his own theory of “ordinary judging” that defines the proper scope of...
A history of the discretion accorded U.S. judges in interpreting legislation (from the Revolution to the present), culminating in the author’s own theory of the proper scope of judicial discretion.
PrefaceIntroduction1Pt. IThe Evolution of Statutory Interpretation: English Antecedents and United States Experience71English History92The United States: From the Revolution to the Founding313The United States: Nineteenth Century594From 1900 to the 1960s: Purposive Interpretation115Pt. IIContemporary Statutory Interpretation1515Giving Judges as Little to Do as Possible: The Rise of Modern Textualism1576Giving Judges Something to Do: Republicanism and Substantive Canons1897Ordinary Judging207Notes257Index of Cases333Index335
\ From the Publisher“Statutes in Court is a valuable contribution. Its historical overview is unique in the modern literature on statutory interpretation. This is a well-written, clearly substantial piece of work.”—Mark Tushnet, Georgetown University\ “Popkin breaks new ground in his historical discussion of English practices, reflecting on this history with the benefit of the more modern insights on legislation and legislatures.”—Nicholas S. Zeppos, Vanderbilt University School of Law\ \ \