National Security Law and the Power of the Purse
The ideal model of national security decision making, whereby the legislative branch authorizes action to protect national security and the executive branch takes it, has broken down due to the speed and unpredictability of foreign crises and the president's monopoly on foreign intelligence. In response, Congress has ceded the initiative to the president, and then utilized the power of the purse to ratify or restrict what the president has done. This power, by necessity and preference, has...
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The ideal model of national security decision-making, whereby the Legislative branch authorizes action to protect national security and the Executive branch takes it, has broken down due to the speed and unpredictability of foreign crises and the President's monopoly on foreign intelligence. In response, Congress has ceded the initiative to the President, and then utilized the power of the purse to ratify or restrict what the President has done. This power, by necessity and preference, has become the central congressional tool for participating in national security policy. Inevitably attacks on policy are transformed into attacks on the making and effects of appropriations. This study addresses the constitutional and statutory questions raised by these attacks. It thoroughly explores the history, mechanics, and scope of the power of the purse in national security, using Vietnam War appropriations and the Boland Amendments as case studies. William Banks and Peter Raven-Hansen provide a unique and provocative primer on the power of the purse in national security law.
Introduction3IThe Early Origins of the Power of the Purse in National Security1The English Power of the Purse112The Power of the Purse in Pre-Constitutional America183The Framing and Ratification of the Power of the Purse in National Security Affairs274The Early Practice: From 1789 to 180933IIThe Mechanics of National Security Appropriations and Spending5The Evolution of the National Security Appropriation Process436The Uses and Abuses of Riders and Continuing Resolutions in National Security547Informal Controls on National Security Spending628The Mechanics of National Security Spending69IIIConstitutional Limits on the Making of National Security Appropriations9The Veto Clause as a Constitutional Limit on Omnibus Appropriations8910The Statement and Account Clause as a Constitutional Limit on Black Budgets100IVThe Substantive Scope of the Power of the Purse in National Security11The General Force and Effect of National Security Appropriations10912Legitimating Appropriations11913Restrictive Appropriations13714National Security Spending Without Appropriation15815Summing Up the Power of the Purse in National Security171Notes183Index255
