Legislative Deferrals: Statutory Ambiguity, Judicial Power, and American Democracy
Why do unelected federal judges have so much power to make policy in the United States? Why were federal judges able to thwart apparent legislative victories won by labor organizations in the Lochner era? Most scholars who have addressed such questions assume that the answer lies in the judiciary's constitutionally guaranteed independence and thus worry that insulated judges threaten democracy when they stray from baseline positions chosen by legislators. This book argues for a fundamental...
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This book argues for a fundamental shift in the way scholars think about judicial policymaking.
AcknowledgmentsPreface1Rethinking Judicial Policy Making in a Separation of Powers System12False Victories: Labor, Congress, and the Courts, 1898-1935423"As Harmless as an Infant": The Erdman Act in Congress and the Courts684Killing with Kindness: Legislative Ambiguity, Judicial Policy Making, and the Clayton Act995The Norris-LaGuardia Act, for Once: Learning What to Learn from the Past1616Legislative Deferrals and Judicial Policy Making in the Administrative State: A Brief Look at the Wagner Act2177Conclusion252Reference List265References270Index279
