Identity Theory Of Truth
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This book argues that correspondence theories of truth fail because the relation that holds between a true thought and a fact is that of identity, not correspondence. Facts are not complexes of worldly entities which make thoughts true; they are merely true thoughts. According to Julian Dodd, the resulting modest identity theory, while not defining truth, correctly diagnoses the failure of correspondence theories, and thereby prepares the ground for a defensible deflation of the concept of truth. Booknews Dodd (philosophy, University of Manchester) argues that correspondence theories of truth fail because the relation which holds between a true thought and a fact is that of identity, not correspondence. He distinguishes his modest identity theory from other identity theories propounded by thinkers including Russell, Moore, and Jennifer Hornsby, and describes the modest identity theory's role as that of diagnosing the failure of correspondence theories and preparing the ground for a deflation of the concept of truth. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)
Preface1Truthmakers, Facts and States of Affairs: a Critique of Correspondence12Propositions, Indirect Speech and Truthbearers193The Nature of Propositions: Thoughts versus States of Affairs494Facts are True Thoughts805From Correspondence to Identity1116A Variety of Deflationism Defended1327Aberrations of Rival Identity Theories158Bibliography188Index195
