Don't Tell the Prime Minister
The prime minister tells us that he did now know that the story was untrue. But he was surrounded by those who knew, or should have known, that there were doubts. The prime minister has the largest office in history, and it is dedicated to providing him with information. In his initial comment to the media, he used the caveat: "If these reports are true." He later said he would ask for checks to be made. If they were, he insists that he was never told the outcome. The advisers never told him,...
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The prime minister tells us that he did now know that the story was untrue. But he was surrounded by those who knew, or should have known, that there were doubts. The prime minister has the largest office in history, and it is dedicated to providing him with information. In his initial comment to the media, he used the caveat: "If these reports are true." He later said he would ask for checks to be made. If they were, he insists that he was never told the outcome. The advisers never told him, and he never pressed them.The 'children overboard' affair formed a dramatic backdrop to the November 2001 Australian federal election, graphically underlining the government's case against asylum seekers. But very soon truth of the incident began to emerge, revealing a tale of mixed messages, conflicting responsibilities, and pre-election pressures.In an account of these events and their aftermath, Patrick Weller, an expert witness at the Senate hearings on the affair, shows how ministers' staff and the senior public service failed to handle this highly charged issue effectively, and how a politically astute prime minister managed not to know the truth about it. He argues that reforms are needed to make ministerial staff accountable and to restore confidence in the senior levels of the bureaucracy.
