Deflationism and Paradox
Deflationist accounts of truth are widely held in contemporary philosophy: they seek to show that truth is a dispensable concept with no metaphysical depth. However, logical paradoxes present problems for deflationists that their work has struggled to overcome. In this volume of fourteen original essays, a distinguished team of contributors explore the extent to which, if at all, deflationism can accommodate paradox. The volume will be of interest to philosophers of logic, philosophers of...
Search in google:
Deflationist accounts of truth are widely held in contemporary philosophy: they seek to show that truth is a dispensable concept with no metaphysical depth. However, logical paradoxes present problems for deflationists that their work has struggled to overcome. In this volume of fourteen original essays, a distinguished team of contributors explore the extent to which, if at all, deflationism can accommodate paradox. The volume will be of interest to philosophers of logic, philosophers of language, and anyone working on truth. Contributors include Bradley Armour-Garb, Jody Azzouni, JC Beall, Hartry Field, Christopher Gauker, Michael Glanzberg, Dorothy Grover, Anil Gupta, Volker Halbach, Leon Horsten, Paul Horwich, Graham Priest, Greg Restall, and Alan Weir
A short introduction11Transparent disquotationalism72Is the liar sentence both true and false?233Spiking the field-artillery414Variations on a theme by Yablo535A minimalist critique of Tarski on truth756Minimalism, epistemicism, and paradox857Minimalists about truth can (and should) be epistemicists, and it helps if they are revision theorists too978Minimalism, deflationism, and paradoxes1079Do the paradoxes pose a special problem for deflationism?13310Semantics for deflationists14811How significant is the liar?17712The deflationist's axioms for truth20313Naive truth and sophisticated logic21814Anaphorically unrestricted quantifiers and paradoxes250
