Correspondence Theory of Truth: An Essay on the Metaphysics of Predication
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This work discusses metaphysical issues such as predication, facts and propositions.
AcknowledgementsIntroduction11Universals, Predication, and Truth101.1The Problem of Universals101.2Theories of Universals151.3Predication, Participation, and Inherence201.4Universals, Truth, and Devitt262The Univocity of Truth332.1Horwich and Deflationary Theories of Truth332.2Alston and Minimalist Realism about Truth372.3The Problem of the Univocity of Truth422.4Reality and the Eleatic Principle473The Correspondence Theory for Predicative Sentences533.1Difficulties about States of Affairs in the Tractatus533.2Truth as Isomorphism between Sentence and State of Affairs583.3The Nominalist Account of Atomic Facts613.4The Realist Account of Atomic Facts663.5Correspondence for Sentences with and without Facts723.6The Notion of Content773.7Austin's Theory of Truth79App. 3.1The Role of Mental Sentences in Tractarian Belief83App. 3.2The Tractatus's Attitude to Truth864Russell's Theory of Truth and Its Principal Problems884.1The Virtues of Russell's Theory of Truth884.2The Variants of Russell's Theory of Truth904.3The Major Problems of Russell's Theory964.4The Problem of the Twofold Role of the Relation974.5The Modes of Composition of Entities1025How Predicative Beliefs Correspond to the World1085.1The Objections to Russell's Theory Analysed as Dilemmas1085.2A Formal Hypothesis in Defence of Russell's Theory1115.3Informal Justification of the Formal Hypothesis1155.4Correspondence for Predicative Beliefs1175.5Criterion of Identity for Russellian Propositions1215.6Intentional Relations1245.7Russellian Propositions as Constructions1275.8The Identity Theory of Truth130App. 5.1Answers to Other Objections to Russell's Theory1326The Metaphysics of Facts1406.1Metaphysical Accounts of the Nature of Facts1406.2Armstrong and Facts as Truth Makers1496.3The Linguistic View of Facts and States of Affairs1546.4Olson's Account of Facts1596.5The Slingshot and the Great Fact1687The Metaphysics of Propositions1727.1Current Theories of Propositions1727.2Minimalism about Propositions1767.3The Ontological Case for Platonism about Propositions1827.4Bealer on Structureless Platonic Propositions1857.5The Structure of Platonic Propositions1907.6Immanent Russellian Propositions1938The Correspondence Theory and Complex Propositions1968.1Complex Propositions and Compound Propositions1968.2Propositions as Subjects of Predication2008.3Conjunction as a Function2068.4Negation and Positive and Negative Entities2078.5Negative Predicative Sentences, Their Truth Conditions and Truth Makers2118.6The Concept of Negation and Negative Propositions2138.7Universal Sentences2168.8Negative Existentially Quantified Sentences2208.9The Problem of Identity Sentences221App. 8.1Logical Constants as Functions230Bibliography236Index245
