Can Death Be A Harm to the Person Who Dies?
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Bypassing the many moral issues concerning death that have arisen over the centuries, Li (Fooyin Institute of Technology, Taiwan) investigates a more basic and abstract question, to which he answers yes. He does so assuming there is no soul and no afterlife, and that death is complete annihilation after which the very person has permanently ceased to exist. He also assumes that life is good, and distinguishes between death and the process of dying, which he admits can be quite uncomfortable at times. Annotation ©2003 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR
PrefaceIntroduction11The Epicurean Argument111.1Explication of the Epicurean Argument111.2A Critique of the Epicurean Argument192The Desire-thwarting Theory332.1Explication of the Desire-thwarting Theory332.2Shortcomings of the Desire-thwarting Theory373The Deprivation Theory433.1Explication of the Deprivation Theory433.2A Critique of the Deprivation Theory484The Interest-Impairment Theory674.1Interests and Harms674.2The Harms of the Death Event and Premature Death744.3Posthumous Harms and the Missing Subject Problem824.4The Timing of the Harm of Death885The Lucretian Symmetry Argument995.1Explication of the Lucretian Symmetry Argument995.2The Failure of the Lucretian Symmetry Argument1015.3Fear of Death124Conclusion131Notes139Bibliography179Index191
