Aiming at Truth
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An original treatment of the question: to what extent is it either desirable or possible for what we think and say to be true?
Introduction 1Truth and the Norms of Assertion 8Why the nature of truth itself is irrelevant 8An argument against truth-aiming 21A revised argument 26Intensional and extensional senses of 'aiming' 31Scepticism - and How Not to Avoid It 38Types of scepticism 38The problem of induction 42The underdetermination of theories by data 50Externalist criticisms 63Transcendental arguments 68Cognitive Contingency 74How to be an alien 74Alternative classifications 78Alternative conceptual schemes 85Radical interpretation 91Further objections 98Belief and Acceptance 108Acceptance as a distinct attitude 108Voluntariness and 'directions of fit' 117Degrees of belief 130Belief and Knowledge 138What is knowledge? 138An 'ecological model' 144Justification regained 155Pragmatism and the Value of Truth 162Rorty on pragmatism 162The autonomy of belief 169Wishful thinking 177Relativism and the Limits of Conversability 185Relativism and error 185Tolerance 191The individuation of cultures 197Mind, World and Realism 203Types of realism 203Transcendental idealism and internal realism 205Representation and the 'Olympian standpoint' 217Conclusion 225Notes 227Bibliography 237Index 244
