Agency and Responsibility: A Common-Sense Moral Psychology
"Taking the problem of weakness of will as her starting point, Jeanette Kennett builds an account of moral agency which gives a central place to the capacity for self-control. Her account of the exercise and limits of self-control vindicates the common-sense distinction between weakness of will and compulsion and so underwrites our ordinary allocations of moral responsibility. She addresses a range of topics in moral psychology, such as the nature of valuing and desiring, conceptions of...
Search in google:
Distinctions between recklessness, weakness of will, and compulsion have been the targets of much philosophical attack. Beginning with the problem of weakness of will, this volume builds an admirably comprehensive and integrated account of moral agency that highly regards the capacity for self-control. It addresses with clarity a range of important topics-such as the nature of valuing and desiring, conceptions of virtue, moral conflict, and the varieties of recklessness-making this work especially important to those interested in philosophy, psychology, law, and moral and legal responsibility in general.
1Introduction: Moral Psychology and Common Sense1Scepticism about Philosophy1Intuition, Convention, and Common Sense2What does Common Sense Say?3How is Common Sense to be Defended?62Classical Theories of Reasons and Motivation9The Socratic Account9McDowell's Account of Moral Motivation17Three Problems with McDowell's View253Humean Accounts of Reasons and Motivation: Davidson and Decision Theory39Davidson's Account of Incontinence40Problems with Davidson's Account44Scepticism about Practical Reason51Decision Theory and Weakness of Will54Hierarchical Accounts of Weakness of Will61Objections to Hierarchical Accounts644Wanting and Valuing72Plato, Aristotle, and Watson: The Parts of the Soul73The Nature of the Connection between Reason and Desire76Reasons and Rational Agents86Rational Action105Conclusion: Towards an Account of Self-control1175A Taxonomy of Agent-control119Self-control, External Control, and Intentional Agency120Self-control and Instrumental Rationality124Autonomy, Orthonomy, and Self-control129How is Orthonomous Self-control Exercised?133Broad Orthonomy and the Limits of Self-control1476Moral Failures and Moral Responsibility: Recklessness, Weakness, Compulsion154The Compulsive Agent155The Weak-willed Agent159The Reckless Agent170The Varieties of Recklessness171Recklessness, Self-control, and Moral Responsibility1807Moral Failure and Moral Responsibility: The Problem of Evildoers186A Rogues' Gallery188Detachment, Engagement, and Holding Responsible191Evil Actions, Self-control, and Moral Responsibility195Freedom, Recklessness, and Responsibility206Bibliography217Index227
